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9NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT 2018
1 Introduction 
Preparedness refers to activities ensuring that all tasks can continue with minimum 
interruptions and that the required exceptional measures can be performed during 
disruptions occurring in normal conditions and during emergencies. The aim of 
preparedness at national level is to safeguard society’s vital functions in accordance with 
the principle of the rule of law. 
The aim of preparedness is to prevent accidents and disruptions, to prepare for the 
measures required during an accident or disruption and plan the recovery process. 
Preparedness planning and cooperation are the duty of the responsible and competent 
authorities.
The preparation of Finland’s national risk assessment is based on Decision No 1313/2013/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism. 
In accordance with Article 6 of the Decision, Member States shall develop risk assessments 
at national or appropriate sub-national level and make available to the Commission 
a summary of the relevant elements thereof every three years. The first national risk 
assessment was prepared in 2015.
In addition to fulfilling the obligation imposed by EU legislation, the aim in Finland is to be 
able to foresee sudden severe events affecting Finland.  The occurrence of such events will 
cause significant damage affecting the lives or health of people, economy, environment 
and society. 
Comprehensive Security is a Finnish preparedness cooperation model in which the 
vital functions of society are looked after through cooperation between the authorities, 
business community, organisations and citizens. The fact that the comprehensive security 
cooperation model applicable in Finland covers all levels and actors of society is its 
strength. Individual citizens also play an important role in independent preparedness and 
in enhancing the resilience of Finnish society.
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The vital functions of the society extend into the statutory tasks of several parties cross-
sectorally, and partially to areas for which it is not possible to specify a single responsible 
party. Vital functions are the starting point of preparedness planning at all operational 
levels. 
Figure 1. Vital functions of the society 
In addition to the national risk assessment, sub-national risk assessments will be drafted 
at the same time. The aim is for the national risk assessment to specify the nationally 
significant risks that need not be re-assessed at the sub-national level. 
The aim of the sub-national risk assessment is to focus on regionally significant risks 
whose management requires activities deviating from the norm and which will cause 
significant impacts at the regional level if they materialise. Disruptions, such as floods, 
storms and forest fires, are often sub-national, but several simultaneous large-scale events 
may lead to a national disruption.
11
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2 Grounds of preparing Finland’s national 
risk assessment
The Union Civil Protection Mechanism underlying the preparation of the national risk 
assessment covers people, the environment and property against all kinds of natural and 
man-made disasters, both within and outside the area of the Union (civil protection).  
The national risk assessment aims to take into consideration the impact of disruptions on 
the vital functions of the society and identify risks that may have a wider national impact. 
This means risks that have to be managed through resource coordination between several 
authorities – regionally or nationally at the very least, or even by requesting assistance 
from other countries. The focus is on internal risks and risks affecting the immediate 
neighbouring area.
The National Risk Assessment project was launched on 30 October 2017. The working 
group was led by the Ministry of the Interior, supported by the Secretariat of the Security 
Committee. The Committee was also responsible for issuing guidelines for the work. 
Representatives of the following parties have taken part in the working group: Ministry 
of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, Secretariat of the Security Committee, Prime Minister's 
Office, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Education and Culture, 
Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of Finance, National Emergency Supply Agency and the 
Finnish Meteorological Institute. In addition, the Regional State Administrative Agency for 
Southern Finland acted on behalf of all regional state administrative agencies in the same 
vein as the Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment of North 
Ostrobothnia represented all other Centres. The Finnish National Rescue Association SPEK 
represented NGOs in the work.
12
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2.1 The methods and the process applied in drafting the risk 
assessment
The process of drafting the National Risk Assessment tapped into different actors’ existing 
risk assessments or similar products as processes as much as possible. In practice, the 
National Risk Assessment is an amalgamation of the different actors’ individual risk 
assessments. Different branches of administration chose threat scenarios and disruptions 
that impact the vital functions of the society at the national level.  
Of the threat scenarios and disruptions drafted by the administrative branches, the threat 
or threats behind the threat scenario and disruption, target of the threat, method of 
materialisation and concatenation and recurrence of disruptions were described verbally.
The competent ministry was responsible for writing its own threat scenarios and 
disruptions by forming a ‘writing group’. The writing groups also took advantage of the 
expert opinions in the ministries’ respective branch of administration. The writing groups’ 
efforts were combined and edited into their final form by the national risk assessment 
working group.
With regard to the threat scenarios and disruptions, the change trend of their likelihood 
was assessed. The impact assessment was made by assessing whether each threat 
scenario and disruption has a direct or indirect impact on vital functions.
EU guidelines were used in drafting the National Risk Assessment. In addition, 
corresponding national risk assessments from other countries were taken into account in 
the planning phase.
2.2 Sub-national risk assessment
The sub-national risk assessments were prepared as a separate project simultaneously 
with the national risk assessment. The sub-national risk assessments were drafted cross-
sectorally so that the region’s municipalities, authorities, businesses and organisations 
were represented in the working groups. The representatives utilised the expertise and 
insights of their communities and reference groups extensively.
The aim is not to identify and list all possible scenarios in the region, but to choose the 
most significant threats or disruptions shared by the operators of the region. Nationally 
significant threats are not to be assessed again at the sub-national level; rather, they are 
ones that are automatically taken into account in each region.
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The results of the sub-national risk assessment and a description of the drafting of the 
assessment are compiled into a written report distributed to the operators in the region 
for use and, if necessary, to other stakeholders. The aim is for the risk assessment on the 
whole to be comprised of national and sub-national risk assessments, which are used 
in joint preparedness, but additionally of each operator’s own risk assessments using 
the national and sub-national risk assessment as the shared basis of preparedness. 
The outcome is that the most significant risks have been identified and assessed cross-
sectorally.
14
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3 Transformation of the security 
environment
In the interdependent world, global trends are part of Finland’s operating environment, 
and they involve risks and threats. Foreseeing, utilising and adapting to them can also 
provide Finland with global opportunities.
Climate change, demographic development, accelerating urbanisation, migration 
between and within states, poverty, youth unemployment, food security, scarcity of 
natural resources and change in the nature of conflicts are examples of intertwined 
questions. Epidemics and pandemics are also security threats.
The transformation of the security environment is also associated with phenomena that 
can be referred to as hybrid operations. The advance warning period of security threats 
has shortened, which sets challenges for decision-making and the preparedness of the 
authorities as well as fluent cooperation between authorities. 
3.1 Turmoil of the operational environment
Finland is closely linked to the turmoil of the global operational environment, both to 
its positive and worrying trends. Both global megatrends and regional development are 
reflected directly in Finland’s international position as well as the wellbeing and safety of 
Finns. As an EU Member State, Finland is committed to the EU’s joint policies. 
Across the world, authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments and several fragile 
democracies restrict the activities of democratic institutions and restrict fundamental 
freedoms and human rights, freedom of expression and social media use. At the same 
time, the lives of millions of people around the world have improved and poverty has 
decreased through growing educational opportunities, longer life expectations and 
technological development. However, development has been imbalanced.
15
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:9 NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT 2018
The prioritisation of national interest and traditional rhetoric of power politics have 
returned to international relations. It seems that the operating capacity of international 
institutions remains limited, considering the expectations, and both states and individuals 
have reservations about their ability to solve problems in world politics. 
If the current development continues, economic wellbeing will polarise between different 
demographic groups and regions. Social, cultural and health-related polarisation will 
also challenge the safe wellbeing society. Inequality and marginalisation are the biggest 
background factors of conventional threats to security, such as crime and becoming 
a victim of crime. In the marginalisation phenomenon, diverse problems, such as 
socioeconomic, substance abuse and mental health issues, often accumulate among 
the same people. Young males commit proportionally the most crimes, and the share of 
young adults at risk of marginalisation is increasing. In Finland, the average age of the 
population is increasing the fastest of the EU countries, and the ageing of the population 
is not spread equally throughout the land; the population of the sparsely populated areas 
is ageing. In economically well-off growth centres, the challenge is in increasing wellbeing 
and income inequality at the local level, which can lead to increasing inequality between 
residential areas.
The physical functional capacity of Finns has seen a downward trend since the 1970s. 
Should this trend continue, poor physical functional capacity will increase the risk of 
marginalisation, impair the productivity of work and increase medical costs. This will also 
have direct negative effects on the performance of military national defence.
The Finnish society is becoming more diverse as the joint effect of several factors. Lifestyle 
differences between different generations are increasing. International ideological groups 
and subcultures are present in Finland through information networks. The role of authority 
figures is changing and power is distributed in a new way. 
Increasing diversity of the population as the result of migration increases the number of 
value groups in the society. The diversity of value communities is an asset that can enrich 
the Finnish society, but actual or perceived fragmentation of values can also separate 
groups of people and increase confrontations and conflicts between the groups. A society 
that is fragmented in terms of values is also more vulnerable to information operations 
based on false information, aiming to accelerate confrontations.
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3.2 Hybrid influencing sets challenges
The Security Strategy for Society specifies hybrid influencing as action in which the aim of 
the instigator is to achieve its aims by using a multitude of complementary methods and 
exploiting the weaknesses of the targeted community. 
Finland is subjected to hybrid influencing that can destabilise the society in new and 
unforeseen ways. One of the key aims is to influence political decision-making. It can 
concern e.g. building economic dependencies, which could restrict the targeted state’s 
freedom of movement in future. The cyber domain and social media provide state and 
non-state actors with an environment in which they, alongside collecting information, aim 
to influence the internal affairs of the targeted country, such as the stability of the society, 
citizens’ opinions, balance of political power and alliances. Trolling and dissemination of 
disinformation aim to artificially divide citizens’ opinions in the targeted country, increase 
discord and decrease trust in the authorities.  
Fixed assets can also be utilised as part of hybrid influencing. Properties can be acquired 
in strategic locations with the aim of gaining a foothold in Finland, decreasing the 
operational prerequisites of the authorities, promoting the use of the properties for 
illegal intelligence operations or otherwise supporting the objectives of the foreign 
state. Economic methods, such as financing, investments and trade, can also be used for 
pursuing influence and dependence that will later restrict the targeted state’s freedom of 
action.
Hybrid influencing aims to drive a wedge between different interest groups, create a 
poisonous atmosphere within the population and weaken the people’s trust in public 
institutions. The business community that supports the operations of the society, with 
its companies, cash flows and employees, is a target just as much as citizens’ opinions. 
Extensive influencing creates a fertile soil in which the entire nation’s tolerance decreases 
and other hybrid operations can be realised more effectively.
It is characteristic of hybrid influencing to take place in the grey zone between the legal 
and illegal, thereby often remaining beyond the reach of ordinary security measures 
of the authorities. Hybrid action can take place under the protection of the freedom of 
speech and assembly, which makes it difficult for the authorities to both maintain the 
cornerstones of the democratic state and prevent harmful influencing.
Both Finland and the rest of Europe have awoken to the risks of hybrid influencing. Free 
communication is a strength, but also a way of attempting to influence.  There have been 
attempts to influence election results, social media has been manipulated and public 
services have been crippled through cyber attacks.  
17
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External and internal security are strongly intertwined in hybrid threats, and it is 
impossible to draw a clear distinction between the two. Hybrid refers to the diversity, 
sudden nature and increasingly extensive range of means of conflicts. 
Some of the highly capable states are ready to act in violation of laws or contrary to the 
norms of international law and responsible behaviour of states. 
Often, the underlying motive of the risk scenarios described in this National Risk 
Assessment can be hybrid influencing or preparing for future hybrid influencing.
3.3 Development and challenges of the digital society
Information and communications technology and related services are transforming the 
operations and power structures of the society in a revolutionary way. Digitalisation 
facilitates numerous technological innovations:
 − artificial intelligence, robotics and other smart technologies
 − internet of things
 − smart automation of traffic
 − utilisation of big data 
 − positioning and time information systems of automated traffic.
The development of technology allows us to make our lives easier and our operating 
methods safer, more efficient and possibly more ecological. At the same time, services 
increasingly depend on the uninterrupted operation of communications services, 
communications networks, radio frequencies and information systems. Any disruptions 
can also affect the provision of services which are key to the operation of the society. This 
is also applies to things, devices and public means of transport, an increasing share of 
which are connected to the internet and the operation of which is controlled through the 
processing of digital data. 
The functioning of digital services also depends strongly on functional international 
connections. Several IT services depend on foreign data centres.  This way, the society is 
dependent on international communications connections and infrastructure.
The importance of the reliability, security and data protection of digital services and 
systems is in fact increasingly emphasised in ensuring the uninterrupted operation of the 
society. 
18
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Cybercrime, large-scale violations of data protection and other disruptions associated with 
data security by either criminals or state operators are likely to contribute to a lack of trust 
among the users of services. This can also lead to a general erosion of trust in the services 
of the digital society and actions of the authorities.
The interdependencies of systems and organisations will increase hand in hand with 
digitalisation. As cloud services and centralisation of systems become more commonplace, 
the multiplicative effects of individual system disruptions can be significant due to the 
concatenation of faults and disruptions. Failures, disruptions or vulnerabilities of jointly 
used electronic platforms can simultaneously affect the availability of the services and 
confidentiality or integrity of data of several organisations. 
There is also a risk of combining publicly available position data and other information 
with large-scale malicious intent, which can have unforeseen impacts on the society.
Interdependency is also increased by an increasing number of devices being connected 
to the internet (internet of things). More and more functions are controlled digitally, 
and therefore disruptions in electronic services can also compromise physical services, 
such as water supply. The operating capacity of the digital society is also threatened by 
strong space weather storms. The most recent storm causing significant impacts took 
place in November 2003, causing a 90-minute blackout in Southern Sweden. In addition, 
malfunctions were observed in numerous satellites, and one satellite broke down.
A strong space weather storm or intentional interference may cause significant direct 
impact on satellite-based data transfer and satellite positioning. This would impact, inter 
alia, transport logistics, emergency services and aviation. The situation could lead to the 
air space being closed temporarily, for example. 
3.4 Weather and climate risks impact the society and 
economy
Rapid climate warming has many direct and indirect impacts on people, the environment, 
economy and society. It increases the risks caused by previously known weather and 
climate-related hazards by changing the frequency and intensity of these phenomena and 
their typical time of occurrence. In addition, it creates new, slower-emerging direct risks to 
Finnish ecosystems, economy, health security and infrastructure. 
Floods, storms and forest fires are often sub-national, but several simultaneous large-scale 
events may lead to a national disruption. 
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In recent years, forest damage and long blackouts have been the most visible impact of 
weather phenomena in Finland. The risk of forest damage will increase further as climate 
change progresses. Even though climate models indicate that the wind speeds of low-
pressure storms will not increase significantly, the estimated decrease in ground frost will 
increase the exposure of forests to wind damage and make harvesting trees more difficult. 
Snow load on trees and power cables is estimated to increase in the areas where snow 
damage is the most common already now. 
Disease and insect damage becoming more common due to the decreased immunity 
of trees is a significant risk to the forest industry. Most fungal diseases also benefit from 
climate change. The biggest individual risk to forests is the spreading of invasive pests 
and pathogens due to international plant trade combined with climate change. The 
forest sector has significant effects on national and sub-national economy, so large-
scale damage and changes in Finnish forests may have economic and social impacts. In 
addition, cultural changes can become major as ecosystems change.
Agricultural climate risks are a major factor at the national level. Extreme weather 
phenomena, such as long spells of high temperatures and drought, rainstorms and 
floods, cause additional problems to agriculture. Moreover, new plant diseases, pest and 
weed species are expected to enter Finland with climate change.  Local self-sufficiency of 
agricultural will continue to be important, especially in global emergency conditions, such 
as if import flows should grind to a halt. 
Drying up of top soil in the spring and extremely dry summers may become more 
common. Drought in the growing season may cause significant damage to forestry and 
agriculture. Prolonged dry periods also increase the risk of forest fires. The number of 
forest fire warning days is expected to increase by 5–10 days from the current level by the 
end of the century. Long drought can also considerably interfere with the water supply 
of communities and industry and also impair the hydroelectric power generation and 
possibilities of power control in the national grid.
As the climate gets warmer, also days on which simultaneous strong winds, high 
temperature and low humidity increase the risk of fires spreading will become more 
common. This increases the risk of extensive forest fires. The risk of forest fires will increase 
also elsewhere in the northern hemisphere, which increases the drifting of particulates to 
Finland and may cause health hazards among risk groups.
The risk of sea, inland water and stormwater floods will also change as the climate gets 
warmer. The sea level will rise in the Gulf of Finland and storms may become stronger, 
which will increase the risk of sea floods. The effect depends significantly on the part of 
the coast. Correspondingly, the change in the inland water risk is location-specific; in 
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places, it will decrease due to there being less snow, while the risk of flooding will increase 
in e.g. large central lakes and the deltas of their outlets. Inland water flood risk may also be 
increased by ice and hanging dam situations.  
The risk of stormwater floods increases when rainstorms and built-up, often impervious, 
land increase. Cities and, in particular, densely built city centre areas are the most 
significant risk zones. The financial costs of a major stormwater flood can be high. Sea, 
inland water system and stormwater flood risks have been taken into account with e.g. 
minimum building heights, land use planning and by implementing other risk mitigation 
measures, such as nature-based solutions.
Extreme weather phenomena, especially more frequent freezing and thawing cycles, 
will probably cause increasing negative and cost effects on the Finnish transport 
infrastructure. Less ground frost and increase in groundwater levels due to increase 
in rainfall will impair the load-bearing capacity of the lower-category road network in 
particular. 
Frost heave of roads in the spring will increase due to milder winters and higher rainfall. 
Climate change will have effects on transport systems, the development outlook of traffic, 
railway structures, maintenance and need for adaptation. 
With climate change, the risk of damage to roads will increase, the risk of floods on 
transport routes will increase and the risks caused by higher groundwater level and 
impacts of climate change in general will increase.
National health risks of climate change include the health hazards caused by hot summer 
weather already now, water-related epidemics, vector-borne infectious diseases, slipping 
accidents and health hazards caused by water damage. New spectrums of disease can 
enter Finland as a result of immigration and travelling. 
The spillover effects can concern security of supply, different sectors of industry and 
increase the likelihood of large-scale immigration. The sectors of industry and businesses 
mostly exposed to the spillover effects are those with nodes in the value chain exposed 
significantly to the effects of climate change, such as changing extreme weather 
phenomena, outside the borders of Finland. 
The global overall economic impacts of climate change are estimated to be negative in 
the long term: GDP is estimated to decrease by 10% at the most. However, the estimates 
of the impacts involve a lot of uncertainties, and the impacts depend on the period and 
the estimates of increase in temperature. The impacts can also be higher than this.
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The effects of climate change will probably also be reflected in the Finnish economy, 
especially via international effects. One way of the impacts being reflected is through the 
international financial market. 
In fact, a major question faced by the financial sector is the extent of risk caused by 
climate change on investment portfolios and when it will materialise.  Climate change 
mitigation policy and physical impacts will be felt directly in different sectors of economy, 
which will be reflected in the asset categories, such as oil reserves or real estate.
Finland’s National Climate Change Adaptation Plan 2022 is part of the climate policy 
planning system pursuant to the Climate Act. The Government approves the national 
adaptation plan at least once every ten years. The adaptation plan includes risk and 
vulnerability planning as well as necessary branch-specific action programmes for 
adaptation. The objective of the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan is for the 
society to be capable of adapting to changes in climate and controlling the related 
risks. The management of weather and climate risks is covered in the sub-national risk 
assessments, as the risks and conditions vary between different parts of Finland. 
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4 Threat scenarios and disruptions relating 
to the security of the society
Changes in the operating environment also have diverse effects on the internal 
development of Finland. The security of the society faces new uncertainties due to them. 
The threats to the society are dynamic, cross-border and varying. In this risk assessment, 
threat scenario refers to a description of potential disruptions in the security environment.
A disruption means a threat or event that compromises vital functions or strategic tasks of 
the society and the management of which requires more extensive or close collaboration 
and communication between the authorities and other actors.
Identifying threats and assessing their impact has turned out to be challenging. 
Monitoring and analysing changes in the operating environment and maintaining 
advance preparedness must in fact be a continuous and active effort of all parties 
responsible for the society’s preparedness and management of disruptions.
Figure 2. Threat scenarios 2018
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The threat scenarios and disruptions drafted verbally describe the underlying threat or 
threats, target of the threat, method of materialisation and concatenation and recurrence 
of disruptions.
With regard to the threat scenarios and disruptions, the change trend of their likelihood 
was assessed. The change can be due to e.g. more general changes in the operating 
environment or technological development. An estimate of the trend of likelihood was 
marked in the table as follows:
 INCREASES , DECREASES  ,  REMAINS UNCHANGED  —
The impact assessment was made by assessing whether each threat scenario and 
disruption has a DIRECT  or INDIRECT  impact on the vital function concerned. In 
addition, the magnitude of the impact on said vital function was assessed as follows: 
*  MINOR IMPACT, ** OTHER NEGATIVE IMPACT, 
*** PREVENTING OR SEVERELY COMPROMISING IMPACT 
Example of the assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.1 Information operations 
Information operations have become more common largely as a result of the 
transformation and speed of communication, emergence of social media and 
diversification of information channels. In the new global communication environment, 
it is possible to reach out to larger masses of people than ever in real time and influence 
the public opinion. Another reason for information operations having become more 
common is the fact that there are states that exploit new technological means and carry 
out systematic information operations with the aim of weakening the target.
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Information operations are action in which the perceptions or action of the target is 
changed through the information and opinion environment by producing or editing 
information or restricting its availability. 
Influencing aims to systematically stir the public debate and fade out the boundary 
between truth and lie. Influencing can also be systematic action carried out by a state. 
Its aim is to weaken the operating capacity of the society and trust in the authorities and 
government.
Propaganda of all kinds has always been used in conflicts in particular; in war, there are 
no similar rules or restrictions as during peacetime. Information warfare is influencing 
propaganda of the warring parties supporting their military objectives. In Finland, 
however, the term used is information operations, which is a more extensive concept that 
also covers influencing efforts during normal conditions.
What does influencing aim at?
The unity and identity of the nation are largely based on a commonly recognised history 
and the story about who we are. If we do not tell our story ourselves, an outsider can 
dictate it. The aim can be to destroy the national story of the sovereign state, thereby 
questioning the very right of existence of the nation.
The aim is for the target of influencing to make decisions harmful to itself or act in 
violation of its own interests. Creating dissent increases citizens’ mistrust towards the 
powers that be and decision-makers. Influencing elections is a typical example. 
The election results can be manipulated by way of illegal cyber attacks, or rumours 
concerning the trustworthiness of the election can be spread on social media. 
Questioning the integrity of the election can threaten the trustworthiness of entire 
Western democracy.
Emotion-based perceptions emerge quickly. That is why information operations aim to 
appeal to people’s emotions and want to spread its own view of the world, with truth 
placed second. Rectifying the false information in public does not necessarily correct the 
previously disseminated false information and damage caused.
Targets and means of influencing
Information operations can be direct or subtle. Typical methods include half-truths, 
exaggeration, outright lying, pressuring, circulating fake news, fake web sites etc. In 
addition, information that is correct as such can be used in a partisan way.
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The free media is a key target of influencing, as it spreads the information on extensively. 
Efforts are made to keep the discussion in media under control with guided strategic 
narratives and multi-channel communication. The media is also influenced by pressuring 
and threatening journalists and disseminating false information about them. 
Misleading can take place with manipulated images or videos, for example, which do not 
have anything to actually do with the alleged matter. The material is distributed through 
“news sites” founded as platforms for distorted information and fake news. Made-up social 
media identities and “bots”, or robot accounts, distribute the information further on social 
media.
Influencing through information takes place everywhere across the world, and Finland is 
no exception. The influencing typically targets the media, citizens and political decision-
makers, people of a certain nationality as well as persons living in other countries who 
have e.g. ties to Finland or follow what is happening in Finland. 
Information operations are carried out by both state and non-state actors. Some distribute 
misleading information using their own name or using “fake identities”.
The first visible cases were seen in Finland approximately eight years ago, when claims 
that spread to the public suggested that Finnish authorities took children of Russian origin 
in particular into custody without grounds. 
The statements of our leading politicians have been distorted, journalists and scholars 
have been threatened and pressured. In addition, unjustified claims questioning Finland’s 
history have been made. 
In addition to influencing originating from outside the country’s borders, the activity 
can also be of Finnish origin. For example, trust in the police or other authorities can be 
doubted systematically on social media. Information operations can aim to hinder or 
complicate the operations of the authorities by influencing legislation.
How to respond to influencing?
It is necessary to be continuously prepared for information operations. Hate speech and 
disinformation threaten to erode the national value base and trust in the society.
The most effective ways to combat information operations are a strong national story 
based on the truth, a high level of education and media criticality as well as efforts to 
straighten lies systematically. Strong structures of society make it more difficult to spread 
lies. 
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The means also include safeguarding decision-makers and their close ones from 
pressuring, threatening and physical threats through training and enhanced physical 
security, among other means.
Trustworthy and independent media is important to citizens’ free access to information. 
In addition, media services and the availability of Finnish content play an important 
role in the stability of the society as a whole and functioning of the democratic system. 
The role of trustworthy domestic media content is emphasised in all disruptions and 
even more clearly as information operations increase. For media companies, the fierce 
transformation of the communications field and weakening financial support has been a 
tremendous challenge in a time where the importance of source critique has increased. 
Diverse media must be supported so that media committed to good journalistic practice 
can expose fake news on behalf of the citizens. Dialogue between the media and citizens 
increases bilateral trust in the truthfulness of communication. Safeguarding the sufficient 
operational preconditions of Yleisradio, the Finnish broadcasting company, also plays a 
key role.
In a time of web-based services, increasing investment in citizens’ media literacy is 
required. Critical use of social media is important to identify fake accounts, for example. 
Media literacy prevents social confrontation and dissemination and spreading of black-
and-white views. Teachers and the entire educational system have an important role so 
that citizens have the skills and resources for identifying and assessing the trustworthiness 
and relevance of information.
The challenge faced by the authorities is that influencing efforts are often detected 
relatively late. Faster identification of fake news and an increasing information flow 
require sufficient resources and 24-hour monitoring. Technology may help in screening 
information, but the right situation picture and measures always require careful 
deliberation by the authorities. Acting in such situations should be trained, which also 
promotes the emergence of swift collaboration between the authorities.
In a Western democracy, it is very difficult to intervene in the spreading of false 
information through legislation. Freedom of speech guarantees everyone’s right to 
voice their own opinion. In election-related influencing, for example, supporting certain 
candidates or parties through fabricated social media accounts is not criminalised.
International and in particular EU-wide collaboration is important in preventing 
both information operations and hybrid influencing more extensively. International 
co-operation facilitates comparing information operations in comparable countries; what 
kind of influencing different countries have experienced, and sharing best practices to 
combat influencing. 
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Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.2 Political, financial and military pressure 
Underlying threat or threats
Political, financial and military pressure (hereinafter referred to as “pressure”) aims to 
influence the decision-making and operations of a state to achieve objectives which 
the targeted state would not otherwise consent to. Pressure can also promote on-going 
matters and events in the target state beneficial to the instigator. The purpose of pressure 
is to question the operating capacity and legitimacy of the political leadership of the 
targeted state and cause general uncertainty and weaken the population’s will to defend 
the country. 
Pressure can also be exerted on media and in international politics and forums. Pressure 
can be comprised of individual measures, it can increase gradually, or it can take place at 
several levels at the same time. Information operations, disturbing information networks 
and denial-of-service attacks are examples of forms of pressure. The instigator of the 
pressure can be difficult to identify.
Target of the threat
The targets of pressure are political decision-making as a whole and vital functions; 
pressure influences the state’s leadership, civil peace and public opinion. Pressure can 
involve disturbing, preventing or interfering in the actions of the authorities, functioning 
of business, services or payment traffic and border violations or concentration of troops 
in the vicinity of borders. Hybrid influencing, which combines military and non-military 
means, including cyber influencing, use of special forces, political assassinations and 
staged accidents, are part of the means available in pressure. 
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Finland will likely be part of a larger group of countries targeted by pressure (such as EU 
member states or NATO member or partner countries). Pressure can also aim to isolate 
Finland from a larger group of countries or partners. 
Method of implementation (possible)
The means of pressure and use of military force are not clearly separated; on the other 
hand, the boundary between state and non-state action is increasingly difficult to identify. 
Regional crises which have also involved the use of military force in recent years have 
emerged through a surprising and fast development of the situation. 
According to the possible threat scenario, instability is caused in the targeted area with 
the means of information operations, also utilising social media. The media may be fed 
with distorted information that distorts the situation picture and makes decision-making 
more difficult for its own part. Cyber operations are also prepared in advance by e.g. 
hacking information systems.
In crises, Finland can be subjected to economic and political countermeasures by e.g. 
parties hostile to the European Union, or possibly unexpected offers of co-operation. The 
position of groups of people living in Finland is reviewed critically and diverse grievances 
are highlighted and their correction demanded. Any actions by the authorities addressing 
foreigners living or arriving in Finland as well conflicts with the majority are given a lot of 
media coverage. 
The means used for pressure combine military and non-military operations, covert 
operations, information operations and cyber influencing, instigating internal conflicts 
within the population and causing imbalance in the society. The means are used and 
varied flexibly as warranted by the situation. 
Pressure can be followed by the use of military force, if the pressure does not achieve the 
desired objectives. The use of military force will probably begin with the aim of a surprise 
momentum and to a limited extent. 
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
In pressure situations, the impacts on people and the environment will remain low, 
but they can become severe from the point of view of the functions of the society and 
the will to defend the country. The indirect economic impact of pressure that involves 
considerable restriction or interference of import and export are significant. Pressure 
affects all vital functions in different ways. 
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Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase 
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4.3 Use of military force
Underlying threat or threats 
The primary objective of sustaining Finland’s defence capability is to create a preventive 
deterrent to the use and threatened use of military force and capability to safeguard 
territorial immunity and repel attacks. Prevention requires the capability to increase the 
defence readiness preventatively and military performance capabilities matching the 
threats. Security threats are prevented and prepared for in accordance with the principles 
of comprehensive security. 
Use of military force against Finland may be the result of a military conflict in Finland’s 
neighbouring regions or reflection from a more extensive international crisis outside the 
neighbouring region. An extensive international conflict can have spillover effects in the 
Baltic Sea region, with Finland becoming a target of use of force in a situation in which 
Finland is not an actual party to the conflict. In a conflict emerging in the Baltic Sea region, 
it is not realistic to assume that Finland would stay outside the conflict. 
One possibility is a situation in which an attack against an EU country brings up the 
question of the obligation of Finland (and other EU countries) to provide assistance in 
accordance with the Solidarity Clause of the Treaty of Lisbon, if requested. 
Intelligence capability, readiness to act in rapidly evolving situations, ability to protect 
against the effects of long-range weapons systems and cyber defence capability are 
emphasised in the changing operating environment.
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Target of the threat
Military force is used to weaken Finland’s international position, operational prerequisites 
of military national defence, hinder the maintenance of vital functions and the operating 
capacity of the economy and infrastructure. Large-scale use of force aims to paralyse 
Finland’s defence capability and prevent the independent decision-making ability of the 
state leadership. 
In addition to national defence, the targets of use of force include disrupting vital 
functions, such as information networks, power and energy distribution networks, 
information resources, traffic nodes, communications systems, logistics and all 
connections abroad.
Being subjected to military force requires allocating a significant proportion of the 
society’s resources to supporting military defence. Maintaining vital functions becomes 
more difficult, and significant strain is placed on employment and the economy. 
Method of implementation (possible)  
Use of military force against Finland is part of the diverse means of influencing, causing 
disruption with a combination of indirect and direct means and aiming to paralyse vital 
functions. The intensity of the use of military force may vary from a low-intensity crisis to 
extensive use of military force. The targets of the use of force also vary in different phases. 
The implementation probably begins with pressure using different means. If the pressure 
does not reach the desired outcome, either limited or large-scale military operations 
can be commenced. The adversary may aim to prevent the use of a nearby area by a 
third party or to form a military buffer zone to protect its strategic targets. Operations 
are supported through information operations. The effect of the use of military force 
or threatening with it is based on the adversary’s ability to create force rapidly and 
unexpectedly. The focal point is on intelligence, use of special forces, air force and long-
range fire and marine operations. 
The adversary implements limited operations swiftly and seeking an element of surprise. 
A limited operation can involve weapons systems or special forces striking military and 
strategic targets, takeover of areas, preventing the use of marine area and preventing 
the free use of air space. A limited operation is maintained only during the time required 
for reaching the strategic objectives and using adequate resources. A limited operation 
involves preparing for continuing the use of force through larger-scale operations. 
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Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
Being subjected to military force weakens the state’s decision-making ability and 
compromises civil peace. Cyber attacks are a threat to national security, and they can 
be comparable to an armed attack in terms of effect and severity. Even small-scale use 
of military force or takeover of a limited area – tying Finland to the conflict – can make 
Finland’s foreign political position significantly more difficult and decrease political 
leeway.
In the scenario of use of military force, use of a nuclear weapon or merely threatening 
to use on in Finland’s neighbouring area has effects on the society even in a scenario in 
which the radiation hazard does not ultimately become severe or only part of the fallout 
lands in Finland. A nuclear weapon will cause a considerably risk to the nearby area also in 
a possible accident. 
Probably, some protective measure will be necessary in at least part of the country in that 
case, and the disruption caused to the society can be significant. The need for radiation 
measurements of goods and people at the borders will be high. People’s need for mental 
support will also impose a challenge on the authorities. Depending on the affected area, 
Finland’s international connections may be partially or completely severed temporarily. 
The use of a nuclear weapon far away from Finland would mainly have diverse spillover 
effects on Finland. 
In addition to the extent of the adversary’s actions, the impacts of the scenario of use of 
military force depend on Finland’s own countermeasures and the society’s resilience. The 
impacts on the society can become very severe.
Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.4 Terrorism and other activities posing a threat to society
4.4.1 Large-scale immigration 
Underlying threat or threats
In large-scale immigration, refugee reception centres and their additional beds are about 
to become full or are overcrowded, the influx of immigrants is continuous and there 
are more incoming than leaving immigrants. Immigration is large-scale when people 
arriving in the country can no longer be forwarded to the scope of measures taken by 
the authorities through border control arrangements or investigating the preconditions 
for entry or registration of immigrants is not possible through normal arrangements. 
Activities will, however, resume in accordance with the legislation applied under normal 
conditions. Finland may also become a pass-through country, with the immigrants aiming 
to reach the neighbouring countries.
International politics and globalisation have effects on the causes, extent and direction 
of migration. The development of the world economy and uneven distribution of wealth 
and other resources intensify migration while labour-related mobility and demand and 
supply of labour promote the immigration of labour. A welfare society is a factor attracting 
migrants and refugees.
International migration is caused by wars and conflicts, environmental and climate change 
and the hope for better living standards. Asylum seekers fear that they will be persecuted 
due to their ethnic origin, creed, nationality, membership in a specific religious group or 
political opinion in their home country or country of residence. Possible technological 
disasters and accidents can also cause major migration. 
There are currently approximately 70 million people displaced due to the threat of war 
or violence in the world. Some 25 million of them have been forced to leave their home 
country. In addition, it has been estimated that there are 200 million refugees because of 
environmental and climate change. 
The number of displaced people is estimated to increase further. The magnitude of 
migration is affected by changing situations in the countries concerned and opportunities 
for travel. 
Target of the threat
The society’s psychological resilience to crisis is the primary target of the threat in Finland. 
The key factor strengthening resilience is the citizen’s faith in the authorities being in 
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control of the situation. Should this fail, it would have significant political effects, and it 
can compromise public order and security. In the scenario of large-scale immigration, the 
biggest threat from the humanitarian perspective affects the immigrants in their home 
countries and along their travel route, and to some extent in Finland as well. 
The second-most significant target of the threat in Finland is the impact of large-scale 
immigration on the public-sector economy. In the long term, the pressure is particularly 
on the funding balance of the social security benefit system in case of failure in the 
integration of those granted asylum. In the shorter term, several other authorities, the 
education system and the judicial system each incur additional costs amounting to tens 
of millions of euros per year. The economic strain caused by large-scale immigration will 
continue for several years after the emergence of the disruption, even though to a lesser 
extent year by year as the asylum decision-making progresses.
Immigration may be associated with political pressure towards Finland. In this case, it is 
possible that criminals, scouts and even special forces are infiltrated to Finland among 
the immigrants. The targets of these actors are critical to vital functions, including key 
personnel. Large-scale immigration can also be used as a means of exerting pressure by 
itself.
Method of implementation (possible)  
The threat scenario assumes that the reason for entry can be an acute situation caused by 
mass exodus, but in practice, immigration can take place in phases, occur as a regional or 
local disruption in immigration in the early phase and gradually expand to the national 
level. The critical threshold of large-scale immigration could be considered as a situation 
in which refugee reception centres and their additional beds are about to become full 
and the established temporary accommodation units are about to become full or are 
overcrowded, the influx of immigrants is continuous and there are exceptionally far more 
incoming than leaving immigrants. 
In the scenario of large-scale immigration, overland routes facilitate the biggest volumes; 
with regard to internal borders, mainly the land border with Sweden, and with regard to 
external borders, the eastern border (border crossings and/or land border). The mobility 
can be influenced by the authorities of the country of origin or pass-though country 
wanting and acting to guide immigrants in their own area.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
The scenario of large-scale immigration involves the risk of not being able to organise the 
control, registration and reception of immigrants in a controlled manner and carrying out 
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the residence permit procedure quickly. The risk concerns the early phase of the situation 
in particular. Economic risk is increased if the authorities do not succeed in organising the 
transition to municipalities and integration measures smoothly after the permit decision, 
or expulsion of those who have been given negative decisions. 
Those who have received a negative decision staying at reception centres, waiting for the 
Administrative Court’s decision on their appeal or expulsion, will increase the likelihood of 
disruptions both inside the centres and in the neighbouring areas. If repatriations cannot 
be realised, the risk of a strong increase in illegal residents will emerge.
Actions by the authorities and signals of the situation not being under control may give 
rise to distrust in the authorities. It will weaken the citizens’ sense of security and increase 
instability in the society. 
As a result of large-scale immigration, strong sentiments towards immigrants may emerge 
in the original population. The opinions of the extremes stand out markedly, and neutral 
communication by the authorities and other actors will be important. The authorities 
must provide citizens with reliable and neutral information about the phenomenon. 
Crisis communications and interaction between the authorities, non-governmental 
organisations and residents an promote correct and trustworthy information reaching the 
audience. 
Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.4.2 Terrorist act targeting the structures of the society or large crowds 
Underlying threat or threats
There are diverse reasons behind violent radicalisation, and there is no single profile with 
which persons who might be planning a terrorist crime or large-scale violence could be 
easily and certainly identified. 
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According to the estimate of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, the threat of 
terrorism in Finland still comes from individual actors or small groups, motivated by 
radical Islamist propaganda or prompts of terrorist organisations. 
These persons are likely to have direct or indirect connections to radical Islamist networks 
or organisations. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service has become aware of terrorism-
linked plans and projects in Finland which have been more serious than before. The 
number of target persons has increased, especially in recent years. 
As a result of radicalisation and revealing of new networks, similar development is 
expected to continue. In addition to quantitative growth, the target persons’ links to 
terrorist activity are increasingly direct and serious. An increasing share of them have 
either taken part in an armed conflict, expressed the will to military action or received 
terrorist training.
In addition, the police has identified a significant number of concern-raising persons with 
the ability and will to carry out attacks on large crowds or structures of the society. 
Target of the threat
An act of terrorism can target the leadership of the society, critical infrastructure, public 
places or large crowds.  An attack can cause limited or significant immediate and also 
long-term effects. It can also have impacts beyond the actual act. It can increase fear 
among the population and the need for security measures. Security measures, on the 
other hand, may have effects on the citizens’ day-to-day lives.
Method of implementation (possible)
The majority of acts of terrorism carried out have recently made use of easily realised 
low-cost methods, such as vehicles and edged weapons. Attacks carried out using simple 
methods are quickly realised and do not require special expertise or long preparations or 
planning, unlike attacks using explosives or firearms.
However, the threat of conventional attacks with explosives or firearms has not gone away. 
They can involve the use of CBRNE materials. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles cannot 
be excluded due to their ease of use and low cost.
A radiation hazard emerges if a radiation source is set off using conventional explosives. 
The severity of the radiation hazard depends on the type and intensity of the radiation 
source as well as the power of the explosive. If an explosive is used in causing the 
incident, the site of the explosion and the surroundings up to 300–400 metres away are 
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contaminated. In addition, there can also be very small, highly radiating fragments in the 
same area, causing skin radiation damage that is difficult to treat when handled for a few 
minutes.
A similar radiation hazard can also be caused by intentionally spreading powder or liquid 
radioactive material in the living environment. The situation might not be necessarily 
noticed very quickly. 
In this case, the people in the contaminated area and handling the contaminated objects 
might even be exposed so much that the situation causes health effects. The situation 
would have significant effects on people’s living conditions and environment.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
An attack on key vital functions, such as an act targeting information network and power 
grid nodes, can cause significant secondary damage on the functions of the society. 
Especially an act of terrorism on the sea (passenger or cargo vessel) would be very likely to 
involve a sea rescue mission and/or environmental disaster management.
Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.4.3 Violent, large-scale civil disturbances
Underlying threat or threats
Different European countries have experienced violent, large-scale civil disturbances, 
which can go on for days. Also people and groups whose aim is to turn the situation into a 
violent riot take part in such disturbances.
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Large-scale and prolonged violent unrest taking place in several places or in different 
towns and cities at the same time may result in a situation that the police do not have 
sufficient resources to keep under control. 
The factors that increase the risk of disturbances include the types of social problems 
and experiences of inequality that affect people’s everyday life, disturbance or complete 
interruption of the functions of the society due to e.g. failure in power supply or the cyber 
environment, increasing social exclusion, actions of extremist movements, the effect of 
the social media and the increasingly tense international situation.
Target of the threat
Disturbances can degrade the security and sense of security of citizens and cause financial 
damage. The unrest an also affect the functions of the society, decrease trust in political 
decision-making and the authorities’ action.
Method of implementation  
People’s dissatisfaction and release of tensions can be agitated consciously and 
systematically. Action on social media, hate speech and fake news feed the sense of 
dissatisfaction among people and may lower the threshold of taking part in violent 
disturbances. Also peaceful demonstrations can be attended by those agitating violence 
and unrest on purpose, aiming to turn the event into a violent riot.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
Unrest has effects on the functions of the society, and should they expand, on the 
possibilities of the police to maintain public order and security. If the situation escalates 
and prolongs, the possibilities of other authorities to provide official assistance may be 
impaired as their resources are tied to taking care of their own duties.  
Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.5 Disruption of the public economy  
Underlying threat or threats
The availability of funding for the public sector is a precondition for safeguarding vital 
functions of the society. Public-sector expenditure is funded primarily through taxes, 
social security contributions and property income. The deficit between expenditure and 
income is covered through lending in the international money market.
Target of the threat
At worst, a disruption of the public economy threatens the state’s funding ability. Loss 
of funding ability may be the result of the state losing its creditworthiness or prevention 
from using the infrastructure required for obtaining funding. 
Method of implementation
The financial risks of the public economy are associated with unforeseen macroeconomic 
development and the materialisation of diverse contingent liabilities. A negative 
disruption of macroeconomy may lead to an economic recession and further to an 
increase in the state’s indebtedness and decrease in financial assets through lower asset 
values. A soft economic situation can cause the state’s indirect liabilities to be triggered, 
thereby further straining the already weakened public economy and national economy on 
the whole.
The materialisation of direct, indirect and hidden liabilities depends on economic 
development. Finland’s economic outlook is expected to be favourable in the next few 
years. However, the development involves risks. With the increase in indebtedness and 
indirect liabilities, the state’s freedom of action and ability to face negative shocks has 
weakened in recent years.
A severe disruption of economic development can be connected to a culmination of 
political tension and juxtaposition in addition to various economic phenomena. All crises 
leading to reduced economic activity should they prolong may lead to compromising the 
availability of funding for the public economy.
Should they materialise, almost all threat scenarios described in this National Risk 
Assessment would have a negative impact on the public economy as well. The financial 
position of the public economy and the state economy in particular is at risk of being 
weakened as the preconditions for economic activity are disturbed typically in crises. 
At worst, tax income may reduce strongly while there is significant increasing pressure 
on public expenditure as unemployment increases, for example. In addition, reacting 
39
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:9 NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT 2018
to disruptions compromising the society’s functioning usually increases needs for 
expenditure when aiming to prevent and mitigate the consequences of the crisis. 
Disruptions of the financial market in particular have typically had strong spillover effects 
on the public economy as well.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
Safeguarding the state’s liquidity and creditworthiness in severe disruptions of the public 
economy requires exceptional measures relating to financial and monetary policy. The 
required short-term measures include preparing for prioritising critical payments, for 
example. In the longer term, it is necessary to make significant spending cuts and increase 
diverse taxes and levies. These measures may have negative secondary effects on the 
national economy, livelihood of the population and various public services.  
Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.6 Disruption of the financial system
Underlying threat or threats
Stable and disruption-free operation of the financial market is a precondition for the 
functioning of the society. Disruptions of the financial market compromise the availability 
of funding that is absolutely necessary for both private and public organisations and also 
individual people. 
Financial market crises can, if not controlled, become economic crisis threatening the 
entire national economy. They can also lead to a collapse of the creditworthiness of 
businesses and the state, thereby destabilising the entire society. 
Disruptions of the infrastructure of the financial market and prevention of the use of 
critical systems can compromise the continuity of vital functions. Functioning of the 
economy and infrastructure, securing the population’s minimum subsistence and carrying 
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out security-related duties require the availability and permanence of asset-related 
information and the ability to make, transmit and receive payments.
Target of the threat
From the point of view of the financial market, threat scenarios have conventionally been 
divided into the materialisation of financial market risks on the one hand and on severe 
disruptions of the infrastructure used for providing financial services on the other. The 
first category incudes the realisation of financial risks relating to the financial market, 
such as liquidity, market and credit risks. The second category, severe disruptions of 
the infrastructure required for providing financial services, is part of operational risks. 
Examples of these include severe disruptions of information systems and data traffic and 
severe issues relating to energy supply. 
The distinction between these risks is, however, becoming more vague. Providing 
financial services has, for the key part, become a digital business. The real-time nature 
of operations emphasises the importance of the continuous fault-free functioning of 
information systems. The materialisation of operational risks may lead to such significant 
financial losses or loss of trust in the market as to compromise the financial continuity of 
operations.
Method of implementation
From the point of view of the financial market, the threat scenarios can be realised in two 
ways: either “from outside” the financial market so that they have a negative effect on the 
financial market, or so that the financial market itself causes a disruption that spreads 
elsewhere to the economy and society. 
International crises of the financial market are a key trend threatening the functioning 
of the financial system. Excessive risk-taking combined with poor resilience underlies 
financial market crises. 
This means that even an unforeseen individual event can trigger a crisis. The impacts of 
such a crisis can concern Finland either directly or indirectly. 
The development of the world economy involves several uncertainties that can also 
contribute to triggering disruptions of the financial market. Geopolitical confrontations, 
disturbances in international trade or political instability can also cause disruptions in the 
financial market. The exceptional monetary policy that has been continuing for a long 
time supports growth, but also exposes the financial market to disruptions. The stability 
of the euro area is still subject to uncertainties as the result of the decade’s economic and 
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debt crisis, and their culmination due to political developments, for example, cannot be 
excluded.
With the digitalisation of the financial sector, also operational systematic risks, cyber risks 
in particular, have emerged. The operating capacity of an individual actor in the financial 
sector can be compromised due to the materialisation of a cyber risk in addition to 
business-related reasons. Such as disruption can then spread to other parts of the financial 
system and compromise market activities on the whole.
The functioning of the financial market is very bank-driven in Finland. The Finnish 
banking sector in itself is very centralised and large compared to the GDP. The structural 
characteristics of the financial system weaken its resilience and strengthen the passing of 
disruptions between parties. As a result of the structural changes in the banking sector, 
Finland is still tied to the other Nordic countries and at the same time to disruptions of 
the world economy as well. Increasing indebtedness of households weakens the ability of 
households and, at the same time, also the entire national economy to adjust to negative 
surprises in the economy. High indebtedness may also intensify the effects of economic 
disruptions.
Should they materialise, almost all of the threat scenarios described in this National 
Risk Assessment would cause some degree of shock in the financial market as well. In 
addition, the materialisation of many of the threat scenarios could lead to the inability to 
use the infrastructure required in providing financial market services.  The functioning of 
the financial market as such can also be chosen as the target of hostile influencing. The 
information systems and information resources required for providing financial market 
services are located abroad in key respects. Prevention of the use of these systems can 
interrupt payment traffic, card payments and securities trading in Finland as well. 
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
Very strong interdependence is characteristic of the functioning of the financial market, 
exposing to rapid spreading of disruptions. A strong negative impact on the rest of the 
national economy is typical of disruptions in the financial market. Disruptions of the 
infrastructure of the financial market and prevention of the use of critical systems can 
compromise the continuity of vital functions. 
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Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.7 Power supply disruptions
4.7.1 Major disruption in power supply 
Underlying threat or threats
Power supply may be interrupted due to a variety of reasons. Extensive and long-term 
regional interruptions in power supply in Finland have been caused exclusively by trees 
fallen on power lines due to storms and packed snow in recent years. Other possible 
threats include extensive technical or man-made disruptions in power generation, 
transmission or distribution. 
There may also be disruptions in the availability of fuels or power import connections. 
The sector can be subjected to cyber attacks or disruptions in labour availability due to 
industrial action or a pandemic, for example. 
Energy infrastructure can deteriorate due to the impact of unforeseen energy and 
climate policy, for example. A threat to power generation also lies in the closing down 
of unprofitable power plants, which particularly concerns condensing power station 
operating on market terms. The availability of power via international links can also be 
exposed to influencing due to political reasons, both in disruptions and normal conditions. 
Rare strong space weather storms constitute a separate threat; their impacts on vital 
functions can be long-term and very significant.
The progress of climate change can increase the risk of major disruptions in power supply, 
especially due to the reduction of ground frost, and increase the exposure of trees to wind 
damage and packing of snow. Freezing rains are also likely to become more common. 
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They increase the exposure of the power distribution infrastructure to damage. Warmer 
summers and long spells of hot weather becoming more common due to climate change 
may also have effects on the functioning of nuclear power plants. A very high sea water 
temperature decreases the cooling power of nuclear power plants. In order to ensure 
cooling, the power plant has to reduce the power of the reactors or close them down.
Target of the threat
Uninterrupted availability of power is particularly critical to security of supply. A severe 
disruption in power supply has effects on all of the functions of the society and can 
compromise vital functions and the wellbeing of the population. During a cold spell, the 
importance of power becomes even more emphasised as the need for heating increases. 
Besides electric heating, the majority of other methods of heating require electric power 
to operate. The situation is alleviated by fireplaces built in several residential buildings as 
well as other alternative heat sources. 
Space weather storms have minor direct impacts on people and the environment, but 
indirect impacts can arise from e.g. interruptions in power supply and problems with data 
traffic. The economic and other impacts will be multiplied if the disruption persists.
Method of implementation (possible)
A disruption in the availability of electric energy due to insufficient power generation or 
import is not easy to rectify in all cases. If there is no adequate backup production capacity 
or possibilities of importing electric power, the only way to react to the situation is to 
limit the overall consumption of electricity, possibly using circulated power interruptions. 
During the winter peak consumption, approximately one-fourth of the need for power 
is covered through imports. If it turns into a shortage of power, the situation can lead to 
curtailments of power use. 
With regard to the national grid, two simultaneous major disruptions during peak 
consumption is a major risk. Simultaneous failure of a major nuclear power plant and 
import connection could be an example of such a situation. 
In this case, the worst case scenario is that the joint use of the entire power system 
collapses, thereby making the entire national grid fall down. It can take days to get the 
grid up and running again.
In the worst case scenario concerning power supply, a strong storm would pass over 
Finland so that there would be extensive areas without power in the area of several grid 
companies at the same time. At worst, correcting the faults and returning the power 
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supply can take several days, even weeks. The situation would be made worse by it taking 
place in the winter, when electricity is used much for heating as well.
During strong space weather storms, geomagnetically induced power currents would 
cause voltage fluctuations in the power supply national grid, and possibly transformer 
damage. Finland’s national grid is relatively resilient against changes in space weather, 
but problems in the neighbouring countries can also be reflected in Finland via the joint 
Nordic power grid and our need for importing electric power.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
The society is very dependent on electric power. Even short (even under 10 seconds) 
disruptions in power supply may cause problems to some industrial processes. If the 
interruption in power supply is prolonged, most functions of the society are greatly 
disrupted or cease to function altogether in practice. 
Disruption or complete cessation of functions due to disruptions in power supply would 
compromise all vital functions of the society.
Interruption of power supply due to a space weather storm could last for the duration 
of the storm, a few days at the most. For some older transformer types, the ultimate risk 
is permanent damage to the transformers, which would considerably slow down the 
recovery of the functioning of the power grid, but this is not considered probable in 
Finland.
Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.7.2 Severe disruption in the availability of fuels
Underlying threat or threats
Procurement of oil, coal, gas and nuclear fuel depends entirely on imports. Energy policy 
aims to reduce the dependence on imports, but a significant share of the procurement of 
fuels will be based on imports also during the next few decades.
The availability of fuels has a major effect on e.g. primary production, food and fuel supply 
transports, public transportation and logistics in general. Fuel supply can deteriorate due 
to the impact of shortsighted energy and climate policy, for example.  
The use of domestic fuels is based on an extensive logistics chain. With regard to biomass, 
for example, the chain includes harvesting, storage (drying), transport and chipping. 
Disruptions in any part of this chain cause the entire delivery to be interrupted, thereby 
disrupting energy production. 
New and alternative sources of energy becoming more common sets major challenges 
also for the system based on conventional stockpiling and regulation mechanism. 
Stockpiling capacity for the new energy sources might be non-existent, and stockpiling 
them can be difficult. 
The reliability of distribution also has significant impacts on the availability of fuels to the 
end users. Distribution being exposed to disruptions may be an even bigger risk than the 
risk of running out of the actual fuel.
Target of the threat
The risk for oil and coal is the prevention of maritime transport and pipe transport of 
natural gas. A disruption in the supply of imported fuels lasting several months will 
begin to significantly hamper the generation of heat and electricity. The risk facing the 
availability of domestic fuels is challenges in logistics and in particular stockpiling. 
Method of implementation (possible)
Prolonged prevention of maritime transport to Finnish ports is possible during 
exceptionally harsh winters. An exceptionally harsh winter would impose increasing 
requirement for the adequacy of ice-breaking fleet, as vessels meeting new environmental 
regulations have poorer ice performance. 
Long-term economic or labour market disruptions affecting Finnish shipping or ports 
would also have significant impacts on Finnish shipping. More limited impacts on Finnish 
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shipping or the functioning of ports could be caused by individual threats relating to 
international crime or terrorism, data traffic or cyber security problems affecting the 
logistics system or major accidents associated with shipping or ports. 
The majority of Finland’s internal logistics is based on road transport; without fuel 
distribution and related fuel deliveries, logistics transports will practically cease until traffic 
fuels are available again. 
The availability of fuels is particularly emphasised with regard to the availability of Finnish 
fuels.   The production of domestic fuels is very decentralised, and its logistics is comprised 
of very many parts. This cannot, however, be considered to be a major security risk, as coal, 
peat or wood exist as alternatives for domestic fuels. A ban on the use of black coal for 
energy has been planned to enter into force in 2029. The ban would take out one option 
from plants firing solid fuel.
A threat scenario associated with natural gas is that deliveries from Russia to Finland will 
be suspended for several months. A liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminal network 
is being built in Finland, which will improve the situation for its own part. A natural gas 
transfer pipeline between Finland and Estonia will probably be completed in 2019. The 
security of supply of natural gas is currently based on the use of substitute fuels in Finland. 
The model will not be abandoned even after the alternative import routes are complete. In 
addition, alternative import routes increase the security of supply of natural gas.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
Disruptions in fuel deliveries can be reflected in power and heat production, business, 
transports and housing. Extensive disruptions can have significant secondary effects. 
Problems with the availability of traffic fuels would also affect the deliveries of Finnish 
fuels. 
Distribution of fuels being exposed to disruptions may be an even bigger risk than the risk 
of running out of the actual fuel. 
Even now, it is not possible to distribute fuel adequately from the distribution points if 
the stations have no power and data connections required for payment traffic. Energy 
supply will not be a straightforward purchase transaction in future, either, but a service 
event requiring more extensive information systems. These information systems are 
decentralised and their production can be located abroad or in cloud services. 
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Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.8 Disruptions in telecommunications and information 
systems – cyber threats
4.8.1 Severe disruptions in communications networks and services
Underlying threat or threats
Without functional communications services and networks, many services of trade 
and society are not available or their use is at least hindered significantly. Many of the 
citizens’ day-to-day services and routines also depend on the reliable functioning of 
communications services and networks. From the point of view of managing the society 
and the psychological resilience of the population, it is important that communication 
between citizens, emergency calls, authorities’ communication channels and mass media 
also function in severe disruptions and exceptional conditions. Uninterrupted functioning 
of radio frequencies is also a very critical function to the operation of the society.
Particularly strong space weather storms are a separate threat to the communications 
network and services. The most recent very strong space weather storm was the 
“Halloween” storm in October–November 2003. In addition to an extensive blackout in 
Southern Sweden, it caused several satellites to experience malfunctions, be offline for 
over a day and break down altogether. 
Disruptions in satellite positioning and the accurate time signal provided with it interfere 
e.g. transport logistics and operations of the authorities.
Target of the threat
Several services vital to the society, such as payment traffic and power networks depend 
on the functioning of communications services and networks. For example, IT services 
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of businesses depend on data connections to foreign data centres. Therefore, severe, 
extensive or prolonged disruptions in the functioning of communications services and 
networks constitute a significant threat to the functioning of the society. In future, the 
society will increasingly depend on the reliable functioning of communications networks 
and services, with an increasing share of things, devices and means of transport being 
connected to the internet and their operation being controlled through the processing of 
digital data. 
Communications services particularly critical to the society include emergency calls and 
transmission of the authorities’ hazard warnings and targeted official announcements to 
citizens. Similarly critical communications networks include, in particular, domestic and 
international data connections and the mobile network. 
In radio frequency disruptions, it is particularly important that there are no disruptions 
in the frequencies used for emergency and security traffic and the authorities’ networks, 
mobile networks, mass media transmission connections and energy supply and civil 
engineering remote control networks.
Method of implementation (possible)
Hardware and software failures are particularly common causes of malfunctions in 
communications services and networks. Approximately 10–20% of severe incidents in 
the functioning of communications networks and services result from power supply 
disruptions. Power supply disruptions also usually last longer than other faults. 
Under normal conditions, radio frequency disruptions are usually caused by a system 
malfunction or other technical fault. The disruptions can be caused by an unintentional 
technical failure or intentional influencing.
Possible other causes of disruptions in communications services and networks include 
data security incidents and new kinds of cyber threats, communication service delivery 
failures affecting a limited group of users or geographical area, extreme weather 
conditions, intentional disturbing of communications, international crime and terrorism, 
major accidents and economic and labour market disruptions.
Cyber threats and intentional interference of communications are examples of conscious 
and intentional action aiming to influence the functioning of communications networks 
and services. Such action can be taken by criminals, terrorists and state actors, among 
others. There may also be political reasons in the background, or in the case of individual 
instigators, the will to show off. Denial-of-service attacks, data burglary, disinformation 
edited through cyber operations, information network intelligence operations and other 
49
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:9 NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT 2018
interference of information networks targeting the Finnish state or society are examples of 
methods of implementing cyber operations. 
At worst, targeting the healthcare system, energy production or industrial control systems 
with a cyber attack may cause material losses and loss of human lives.
In addition, a particular disruption in communications services can be associated with the 
name services of the fi domain. A severe technical problem in the fi root name services 
would stop all fi-suffix traffic on the internet. Such a situation could emerge not only as a 
result of a technical fault, but also due to intentional influencing.
A strong space weather storm would interfere in satellite-based data transfer, or the 
complete destruction of a satellite could cause significant immediate damage to the users 
of satellite connections. Satellite positioning would be completely out of operation for 
approximately 24 hours, after which there would be disruptions in it for a few days. The 
loss of the time signal of a positioning satellite could affect the functioning of mobile 
phone base stations and other synchronised systems. The HF radio connection to planes 
flying over oceans would be lost in extensive areas, which would lead to flights being 
delayed or cancelled due to safety reasons. Flight routes would also need to be altered. 
Solar activity could interfere with the radar systems of airports and, in the worst case, close 
down the air space for a few hours.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
Due to the interdependencies of various electronic systems and services, the 
concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions is a significant threat. A disruption 
in the functioning of communications networks or services affecting power generation, 
for example, would have extensive impacts on the society. Also, disruptions in individual 
network services could be a risk to the availability of services if a considerable number 
of other services depend on the functioning of a single service, such as authentication 
services. The interdependency of systems is also increased by an increasing number of 
devices being connected to the internet (internet of things).
A very severe, extensive or long-lasting disruption in the functioning of communications 
services, networks, the fi domain or radio frequencies would also deteriorate public 
trust in the electronic services of different sectors, for example, and also cause indirect 
disruptions in the maintenance or security of these electronic services in the society.
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Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.9 Disruptions in logistics
Underlying threat or threats
The logistics systems is comprised of transport of goods and people, transport-related 
interim storage, logistics centres and control and management processes and systems 
associated with the management of the overall systems, as well as associated cash 
flows. Logistics make use of the traffic system as part of its operation.  The management 
processes and systems are electronic and based on data transfer and processing. Logistics 
systems are usually global, but partially also national.
Maritime transport accounts for 90% of the exports and 70% of imports in Finnish foreign 
trade. Maritime transport-related disruptions would therefore be immediately reflected 
in Finland’s economy and society as well as the transport logistics system supporting 
their operation. From the point of view of the security of supply of Finland’s economy and 
the functioning of the society, fuels are the most noteworthy product category. Fuel is 
imported to Finland by sea to a significant extent. 
Target of the threat
Disruptions in the international logistics system and maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea or 
availability of air space in Finland’s neighbouring area would also cause significant impacts 
on Finland’s logistics system. Such significant disruptions could result from a change 
in international or European security political situation, prolonged extreme weather 
phenomena relating to shipping in the winter or natural disasters affecting aviation. 
Such threats would have immediate effects on Finland’s economy and society, as the 
normal transport routes of Finland’s foreign trade would not be available. In particular, the 
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transport volumes of Finnish shipping are so high that replacing the current sea transport 
routes with alternative transport routes and methods would be extremely difficult.
Long-term economic or labour market disruptions affecting Finnish shipping or ports and 
distribution issues with power or fuels would also have similar, but more limited impacts. 
Impacts more limited than those described above would be caused by individual threats 
associated with international crime or terrorism and major traffic accidents. The logistics 
system can also be influenced via information systems through e.g. cyber attacks, data 
burglary, sabotage or malware, which can lead to considerable damage.
Method of implementation (possible)
The likelihood of disruptions affecting maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea or availability 
of Finland’s nearby air space due to changes in the international or European security 
situation is very difficult to estimate in practice.
The most significant extensive risk associated with Finland’s logistics system that can be 
estimated is extensive freezing of the Baltic Sea. Should it continue for long periods, it 
would cause significant problems to Finland’s foreign trade and security of supply.  
Vessels meeting new environmental regulations have poorer ice performance, which 
sets increasing requirements for the adequacy of the ice-breaking fleet. As a result of 
rapid climate warming, there will be less ice cover in the Baltic Sea, but challenging ice 
conditions will continue to occur. In practice, extreme weather and climate phenomena 
will increase, and therefore attention must be paid to exceptional conditions. There is also 
the risk of the ice-breaking fleet being reduced due to milder winters being common, and 
therefore a shortage of fleet during a winter with harsh ice conditions.
Long-term economic or labour market disruptions affecting Finnish shipping or ports 
would also have significant impacts on Finland’s logistics system. More significant, but 
also more limited impacts could be caused by individual threats relating to international 
crime or terrorism affecting Finnish shipping or the functioning of ports, data traffic or 
cyber security problems affecting the logistics system and major accidents associated 
with shipping or ports. The above-mentioned threats can also be associated with more 
extensive hybrid influencing scenarios.
Restrictions to the use of Finland’s or nearby air space would have direct impacts on 
aviation at Helsinki Airport. Significant foreseen restrictions to the use of air space can be 
caused as a result of an ash cloud caused by a volcano, for example. Long-term economic 
or labour market disruptions affecting airports or international airlines would also have 
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significant impacts on Finnish aviation. Significant, but more limited impacts would be 
caused by international crime or an act of terrorism affecting aviation or the operation 
of airports, data traffic and cyber security issues in flight control systems, power supply 
or aviation fuel distribution issues and major aviation accidents. The above-mentioned 
threats can also be associated with more extensive hybrid influencing scenarios. 
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
Power and fuels are basic prerequisites for the functioning of logistics; disruptions in them 
are multiplied and require cross-sectoral preparedness. Power supply disruptions would 
interfere with the distribution of traffic fuels, for example.  A power failure in the national 
grid would have significant impacts on rail traffic. 
Severe maritime shipping disruptions would cause problems in fuel supply, which, in 
turn, would be reflected in traffic fuel distribution and other road transports, affecting 
e.g. the operation of daily consumer goods trading. Disruptions in the availability of 
daily consumer goods impair the functional capacity of the population and services. 
Disruptions in the supply chain quickly have impacts on medicine supply and health and 
medical care. Disruptions in export transports would be quickly reflected in the economy.
Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase 
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4.10 Disruptions in health security
4.10.1 Antimicrobial drug resistance
Underlying threat or threats
Antimicrobial drug resistance refers to microbes becoming resistant to pharmaceuticals 
used in the treatment of infections in people and animals (antimicrobial drugs and 
antibiotics). Antimicrobial drug resistance is not a new phenomenon, but large-scale use 
of antimicrobial drugs in people and animals, rapidly increased tourism and movement of 
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foodstuffs and animals between countries and continents have deteriorated the problem 
with resistance. Currently, there are microbes resistant to all antimicrobial drugs in use in 
the world, meaning that there are no more effective drugs for treating infections caused 
by microbes of this type. 
Increased resistance to antimicrobial drugs in production animals means, above all, 
increased production costs and losses, which have effects on the price of food and, at its 
worst, even its availability. Household pets live in close contact with people, and bacteria 
and resistance factors easily pass between people and pets.
Finland’s extremely small pharmaceutical market is vulnerable to disruptions. Stockpiling 
regulations require inventories corresponding to the consumption of 6 months (public 
healthcare) or 10 months (pharmaceutical companies) for human antimicrobial drugs. 
Only critically important drugs for production animals are subject to statutory stockpiling, 
but the required inventory level only equals the average consumption for three 
months. The aim of this stockpiling is to reduce problems caused by disruptions in the 
international availability of antimicrobial drugs. 
In global crises, the demand for ordinary antimicrobial drugs increases while their 
availability globally decreases due to increased demand.   The production of old but 
efficacious antimicrobial drugs is centralising, and they are manufactured by few 
pharmaceutical producers. In addition, even if there are several products with the same 
ingredient in the market, it is possible that the active ingredient of all of these products is 
a single factory outside the EU. 
Target of the threat
Finnish care institutions and their patients, healthy Finns and travellers. Production 
animals, those working with them, indirectly consumers, and pets and their owners. 
Method of implementation (possible)
A microbe that is fully or almost fully resistant to all antimicrobial drugs spreads in acute 
hospitals and long-term care facilities. In acute hospitals, the microbe causes infections in 
immunocompromised patients, the treatment times become longer and some patients 
die from the infections. The microbe is of such nature that it is difficult to eradicate it from 
the care institutions. The microbe survives in the long-term care institutions and then 
returns to the acute hospitals with patients from them. 
A microbe that is fully or almost fully resistant to all antimicrobial drugs with increased 
virulence spreads around the world. Finns catch it abroad or in Finland. Due to 
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antimicrobial drugs being inefficacious and the microbe’s virulence, otherwise healthy 
patients succumb to infections. A microbe that is very resistant to antimicrobial drugs 
causes infections in outpatients that can no longer be treated with drugs used in 
ambulatory care. This burdens hospitals.
There is a long interruption in the production of the antimicrobial drug. There are no 
replacement producers or due to it being slow to scale up the production process, it takes 
six to twelve months for the new producers to commence operations. This makes treating 
infections in people or animals more difficult or prevents it.
Resistant pathogens becoming more common in production animals or pets may lead 
to a situation in which there are no longer any potent antimicrobial drugs for treating 
infections in animals. If the infection cannot be treated without antimicrobial drugs, the 
remaining alternative is to put the animal down. This causes losses to animal production 
and also has effects on food production. In this case, there may be political pressure to 
amend the legislation restricting the use of antimicrobial drugs.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
In Finland, there is currently relatively good and comprehensive monitoring of 
antimicrobial drug resistance in place. However, problem-causing microbes usually 
originate abroad, and not all countries are capable of monitoring the development of 
resistance. It is possible for a microbe that is fully or almost fully resistant to antimicrobial 
drugs to spread across the world unnoticed. Detecting and combatting an epidemic that 
takes place in the area of several different care institutions is difficult in Finland as well. 
The development of antimicrobial drug resistance and problems with the availability 
of antimicrobial drugs may separately or jointly lead to a situation in which efficacious 
antimicrobial drugs are not available for treating infections in people and/or animals. 
Antimicrobial drugs are needed during pandemic influenza to treat the sequela of 
influenza. Antimicrobial drug resistance and/or problems with the availability of 
antimicrobial drugs increase the mortality of the pandemic influenza. 
A security political crisis affecting Finland directly or indirectly would probably 
significantly interfere with merchant shipping in the Baltic Sea and aviation to Finland, 
which would hinder the availability of antimicrobial drugs. An armed conflict in Finland 
can significantly increase the need for antimicrobial drugs. 
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Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.10.2 Pandemic influenza or similar widespread epidemic
Underlying threat or threats
Pandemic influenza refers to an epidemic caused by a new subtype of the influenza A virus 
spreading fast across the world. In a pandemic, morbidity can be higher than in a normal 
seasonal influenza. According to international estimates, 25–35% of the population may 
fall ill, while morbidity in seasonal influenza is 5–15%. In addition, the clinical picture of 
the influenza can be more difficult in a pandemic influenza than in seasonal influenza. 
Also completely healthy adolescents and adults suffer from severe forms, not only those 
in risk groups based on a disease or age. There can also be other pathogens causing 
corresponding threats than those described above.
Target of the threat
Pandemic influenza is a significant risk from the society’s point of view, as a large group 
of people will fall ill and many will succumb. The infection spreads easily via droplets 
between people, the population has no resistance against the new virus, and there is 
no preventive vaccine if the pandemic breaks out. The most recent extensive pandemic 
influenzas have broken out every 10–40 years, and the likelihood of a new influenza 
outbreak is high. 
Method of implementation (possible)
The magnitude of the risk and severity of the pandemic are impossible to estimate in 
advance. The symptoms of pandemic influenza are usually similar to those of seasonal 
influenza, but the symptoms and sequela can be far more severe. Preventing the influenza 
and its spreading is successful only to a very limited extent. 
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After infection, there is no adequately efficacious treatment, as the current antiviral drugs 
can only shorten the duration of illness and reduce the likelihood of sequela.
The influenza A virus has caused four global epidemics, also known as pandemics, during 
the last one hundred years: in 1918–1919 (Spain), 1957–1958 (Asia), 1968–1969 (Hong 
Kong) and 2009–2010 H1N1 influenza (Mexico). 
The most recent pandemic was caused by a new subtype of the influenza A (H1N1) virus 
with structures of influenza A strains typical of pigs, birds and humans, emerging in 2009. 
The population did not have antibodies to this virus, except for the elderly.
In addition to pandemics, the avian influenza (H5N1) was considered to be a pandemic 
threat in 2003–2006. Cases of avian influenza occur continuously around the world, but 
significant transmission of the virus from one human to another has not yet been found.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
A pandemic can threaten almost all vital functions of the society, not merely the 
healthcare system and its functioning. Critical situations occur when large groups of 
people fall ill at the same time. Vulnerable sectors include leadership, defence, internal 
security, energy supply, transports and food supply. The social, productional and 
economic impacts of a pandemic are significant. Personnel falling ill and personnel 
shortage increases the burden and risk of errors of those working. 
The aim is to restrict the harmful effects on the health of the population and safeguard the 
functions of the society as well as possible. The most important measure in preparedness 
and civil protection is vaccination against the virus causing the pandemic. Vaccination is 
the most effective way of combatting pandemic and its spreading and harmful effects, but 
the development of a vaccine can begin only once the pandemic virus has been isolated. 
Production of a vaccine takes months, so vaccines usually cannot influence the first wave 
of a pandemic influenza. 
Antiviral treatment of influenza, usually started as quickly as possible once the symptoms 
appear, can shorten the duration of illness and reduce the number of sequela. The Finnish 
National Emergency Supply Agency has stockpiled antiviral drugs in case of a pandemic. 
Antimicrobial drugs are needed in the treatment of the sequela caused by the influenza, 
and in addition to the public sector, also the private sector is required to stockpile them. 
Disruptions and problems in the availability of both vaccines and pharmaceuticals 
increase the magnitude of the impacts of a pandemic.
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Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.10.3 Highly infectious severe animal disease
Underlying threat or threats
Highly infectious severe viral animal diseases can, if they spread to Finland, significantly 
impair the operating prerequisites of animal production, damage natural animal 
populations, prevent or significantly interfere with exports or trade of animals or products, 
and in some cases transmit from animals to people, causing people to fall severely ill.
Target of the threat
Animal farms. There are also avian influenza strains that can infect humans. They are rare, 
they are not discussed here.
Method of implementation (possible)
African swine fever causes a fatal haemorrhagic fever in pigs, and there is no cure or 
vaccine for it. The disease is transmitted via live pigs, pork and other pig products and 
virus-infected goods and materials. African swine fever has spread from Africa to Caucasus 
and from Caucasus onward west in the wild board population since 2007. The disease 
also occurs in animal farms in Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine, Moldova, the easternmost parts 
of the EU and China. In Estonia and some Baltic countries and in Finland’s neighbouring 
areas in Russia, there are lots of cases of African swine fever in wild boars, and to some 
extent also in domesticated pigs. This year, ASF infections leaped to Belgium, likely 
transmitted through foodstuffs. The risk of infection in Finland is through pork products 
and contaminated goods and via a wild boar carrying the virus.
A bigger risk of avian influenza emerged in 2005. Each year, there are cases of avian 
influenza at production farms in the EU. In winter 2016–2017, there were lots of avian 
58
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:9
influenza cases. Last winter, their number was lower, but during both seasons, highly 
pathogenic avian influenza has been found in natural birds in Finland. Transmission to 
poultry farms is possible if poultry get in contact with wild birds or their faeces. At least 
some H5 and H7 subtypes can also transmit to humans.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
African swine fever and avian influenza are highly infectious animal diseases, among 
others. Both animal diseases cause interference to food production and the export and 
trade of animals and animal products. All of the animals of said species at the farm are 
slaughtered and the carcasses destroyed. In addition, 3-km and 10-km safeguard and 
monitoring zones are established, with restrictions imposed on farms within them. 
The farms within these zones are inspected. The disruption depends on the size of the 
epidemic. According to risk estimates prepared by the Finnish Food Authority Evira, the 
epidemics would remain small-scale in Finland. Farms struck by the animal disease will 
suffer major financial losses. The costs incurred due to the actions by the authorities 
and the fair value of the animals will be compensated for. Compensation for production 
losses is discretionary, and depends on e.g. the magnitude of the epidemic and the 
appropriations available.
Animal diseases epidemics cause difficulties in exporting products of animal origin. 
The financial impacts on animal production are considerable Due to interference of 
production chains, disposal of animals, any loss of breeding animals, interference caused 
by slaughter and transport, regional transfer restrictions and consumer confidence. The 
disruptions in export alone very quickly amount to tens of millions of euros.
Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.10.4 Plant hazards – plant disease epidemic
Underlying threat or threats
New plant hazards spreading to Finland or plant hazards already occurring here are 
estimated to increase with climate change and due to international trade. Plant hazards 
cause direct and indirect harm by e.g. killing plants, contaminating arable land, causing 
problems with the export of plants and plant products and the availability of seeds and 
seedlings.
Target of the threat
Crops cultivated in Finland, garden production, forests and green areas. The Agrilus anxius 
pest would target birch trees. The pine wood nematode would target pine trees. The 
potato wart disease would affect potato production.
Method of implementation (possible)
Several plant hazards enter Finland with plants, plant products or other goods from third 
countries or the EU’s Single Market as trade increases. With climate change, cultivation 
of new plant species will begin in Finland, acting as host plant for new plant hazards and 
promoting them settling here. 
Winters are also estimated to become milder and wetter, which increases the survival of 
plant hazards over the winter to the next year.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
If plant hazards are not detected in time, they can reproduce and possibly spread further. 
This makes their eradication more difficult or even fail, and they can settle in Finland. The 
costs of eradication are also increased. 
Evira has prepared contingency plans for health hazards which are the most significant to 
Finland’s agriculture and forestry.
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Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
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4.11 Water supply disruptions
Underlying threat or threats
A severe water supply disruption or health hazard due to water quality can be caused 
by natural phenomena or human activities. Disruptions caused by natural phenomena 
include rainstorms, floods and storms. Climate change and the increasingly common 
extreme weather and water conditions caused by it are also estimated to increase the risk 
of water supply disruption due to drought. Man-made water supply disruptions include 
interruptions in power supply and telecommunications, accidents at water source areas 
and water intake plant, faults in water intake and treatment equipment and the pipeline, 
accidents due to human factors and malicious acts. 
Target of the threat
Large cities and towns, significant production plants, food industry in particular, social and 
healthcare and units and other critical services.  
Method of implementation (possible)
The most significant threat involves extensive water supply or water quality disruptions 
affecting major urban centres. Water supply or water quality disruptions in major urban 
centres or services key to the functioning of the society may have significant negative 
effects on the functioning of the society. Water supply disruptions can be caused 
particularly by extensive power supply disruptions due to weather and climate factors 
or ageing infrastructure that cannot cope with the overload from floods and rainstorms, 
for example. Prolonged drought can also make water supply more difficult in Finland, 
especially in rural areas. An extensive water supply disruption lasting even more than 
twelve hours can be considered severe. 
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The biggest need for power in water supply is associated with the transfer of water. 
Pumping is required throughout the production process from water intake to purification 
and distribution of water. During a blackout, the network also cannot be kept under 
pressure, which allows harmful substances to enter the water network. Increasing floods 
and rainstorms may also cause significant health hazards, as large volumes of water carry 
solids and impurities and may cause uncontrolled wastewater emissions.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
Water supply disruptions are severe as they have extensive impacts on the functioning of 
the society. An interruption in water supply easily paralyses the provision of services, such 
as food production, and endangers the functioning of healthcare, for example. Supply 
disruptions as such can also cause qualitative hazards to water supply. Unlike a disruption 
involving the availability of water, deterioration of water quality can cause significant 
threat to life. 
Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.12 Disruptions in food supply
Underlying threat or threats
Food supply can be exposed to diverse threats that can be unintended or intentional. 
The threats target personnel, availability of information systems, raw materials, different 
phases of the production process, storage, transport and also sales to the end user. 
The target can be any part of the food system, which is comprised of primary production, 
food industry, retail, distribution and consumption. Alternatively, it can concern an 
affiliated sector, such as due to an extensive power failure, pandemic or disruption of the 
payment system, in which case the impacts also strongly affect retail and sales. 
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Nature-related threats include plant diseases and pests, animal diseases and diverse 
threats caused by weather and climate, such as storms, drought, floods and volcanic 
eruptions. The last also concern Finland’s food production even if they take place 
elsewhere in the world. Should they materialise, these threat scenarios affect food 
production or make deliveries, transport and distribution of raw materials more difficult. 
At worst, they compromise the availability of food and cause financial losses to producers 
and the national economy on the whole. 
Increasing with climate change, extreme weather and water condition phenomena 
hinder food production in the world’s strong food production areas in the long term. At 
the same time, the world’s population is increasing, groundwater reserves are used in an 
uncontrolled way and land use is becoming more difficult. The risk of crises and conflicts 
caused by food and water shortage increases.  In Finland, probable warming up of the 
winter season, increasing rainfall and strong winds will increase the risks to the society and 
economy. 
Foods may be contaminated and spoil due to different reasons in different phases of 
the process. There can be a technical fault in the production process that is not noticed 
early enough, or the raw material could include a pathogen already when entering the 
process. However, it is the benefit of the food system that problems affecting a single 
food chain or company do not prevent the availability of food. The financial losses can 
be significant and result in major restructuring. The food offering can be restricted and 
simplified in disruptions. Food safety is very highly supervised. Most commonly, foodstuffs 
are contaminated when a microbiological, chemical or physical hazard enters the process 
(e.g. salmonella, EHEC and listeria bacteria). In Finland, this is very rare, and recalls work 
effectively. 
Target of the threat
Food industry, distribution networks, agricultural and greenhouse companies, retail, 
professional kitchens and citizens.
Method of implementation (possible)
The risks affecting the operations of the food sector can target the production inputs, 
transport, data traffic and information systems or directly the production and distribution 
process. At worst, they can prevent food supply. The raw materials or finished products 
can end up in the wrong places, or the delivery or sale of the products is prevented. 
Manipulating the production process, such as by altering the amounts of chemicals, can 
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cause severe consequences, such as illness or even deaths. The difficulty of detection or it 
remaining undetected can make the situation serious. 
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
What makes a cyber attack difficult is that if it spreads, it can paralyse several production 
plants almost simultaneously. Correspondingly, disruptions in telecommunications and 
information and payment systems immediately prevent the citizens from obtaining 
foodstuffs in the normal way and the functioning of food services. In addition, such 
disruptions prevent the operations of also professional and large-scale kitchens and 
wholesale operations. A short-term stop does not severely compromise the functioning of 
food supply, but non-existent stockpiles in all parts of the chain will lead to disruptions in 
a few days. If the situation is prolonged, food supply is compromised.
In case of an extensive epidemic caused by foodstuffs and there is no certainty of the 
cause, it burdens healthcare services and can test the citizens’ psychological resilience to 
crisis. Loss of consumer confidence in food safety and availability may lead to unrest and 
disturbances, if trust in the authorities is deteriorated at the same time.
Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
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4.13 Large-scale accidents
4.13.1 Maritime multi-sector accident
Underlying threat or threats
The Baltic Sea is a sea region with significant maritime traffic volumes throughout the year. 
Channels that are difficult to navigate and dark and wintry conditions impose challenges 
on navigation and increase the threat of maritime accidents. 
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A strong growth in the volume of oil and chemical transports in the Baltic Sea has 
increased the possibility of severe environmental accidents. As the result of a maritime 
shipping accident or ground-based oil or chemical spill, significant amounts of oil, oil 
products or chemicals can end up in the sea.
The volumes of maritime transports are expected to increase by approximately 30–50% 
from the level of 2010 by 2030. Increased traffic volumes increase the risk of maritime 
accidents in the area. The growth is estimated to focus particularly on container traffic. 
The volume of oil transports is, on the other hand, expected to decrease slightly with 
replacement fuels, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) and biofuels, becoming more 
common. 
The strongest growth in maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea region will take place in the Gulf 
of Finland and southern Baltic Sea. Rapid fluctuations in the global economic policy, oil 
price, international crises and terrorism can also change the situation rapidly. 
Also, an increase in maritime technology can have effects on the threat of maritime 
accidents. Technology associated with the management of vessels and navigation aids 
failing on narrow or heavily trafficked lanes can have serious consequences. In addition, 
in the long term, the development of the automation of maritime traffic can bring about 
new kinds of vulnerabilities that cannot be yet properly estimated. 
On the other hand, the automation of maritime traffic may reduce the threat of accidents 
caused by human errors. 
Target of the threat
The threat primarily concerns people and the environment. With regard to people, the 
most severe accident types taking place in the sea area are vessels capsizing or sinking 
due to running grounding, bottom contact or collision and uncontrolled fire aboard a 
vessel. Onboard fires are the most significant threat when loss of life or severe injury 
are concerned. The worst-case scenario is the evacuation of a passenger vessel under 
difficult conditions or collision between a passenger vessel and oil tanker/vessel carrying 
chemicals. 
In an oil and chemical accident, the target of the threat depends on the spreading of the 
spill and exposure of people and ecosystems to the different components of the spill. Oil 
ending up in the sea as the result of a major accident ends up on shores to a large extent. 
A small fraction sinks, while certain components dissolve in water or evaporate. In case of 
a fire, fire gases spread into the air. 
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An oil and chemical accident can cause diverse impacts on ecosystems, and they are often 
difficult to detect and prevent. The ecological impacts are both quick and direct as well as 
long-term and indirect. The ecological impacts of an oil accidents on a population adapted 
to the Baltic Sea can be very severe, even permanent. Due to the poor condition of the 
Baltic Sea, even slight additional contamination can be fatal. In addition to the vessels 
in traffic in the Baltic Sea, there are an estimated 22 high-risk shipwrecks in Finland’s 
territorial waters, with probably up to 200 tonnes of oil. In addition, as many wrecks with 
over a hundred tonnes of heavy fuel oil but involving less risk are known.
Method of implementation (possible)
The worst-case scenario assessed involves two vessels, at least one of which is a large 
passenger ship. The other one can be a vessel carrying hazardous substances or another 
large passenger ship. The total number of people to be evacuated can be 6,000. 
In accidents involving oil and chemical transport vessels, the most significant threats 
are related to tankers grounding, colliding and fires. Ground-based spills originate in 
production plants and storage areas. In both cases, human factors and technical failures 
play a significant role in peacetime accidents. Technical faults aboard vessels include faults 
in the engine, propulsion, steering or navigation systems. 
Underlying major land-based spills there are often operating faults with equipment used 
for transferring oil or chemicals or leaks in pipelines or tanks.
Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
The after-treatment of a major environmental accident can take months, even years. 
Cleaning and restoring contaminated environment place a burden on the resources 
available.  Waste treatment, for example, requires large interim storage and retention 
areas and causes logistical challenges. In addition to environmental damage, the financial 
damage to businesses and especially tourism in the area can be significant.  
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4.13.2 Severe nuclear power plant accident in Finland or Finland’s 
neighbouring areas
Underlying threat or threats
There are four nuclear power plant units in Finland: two in Loviisa and two in Olkiluoto. In 
addition, a new unit, Olkiluoto 3, is about to be started in Olkiluoto. One plant unit is also 
being planned in Pyhäjoki. 
Finland’s neighbouring area includes the Russian Leningrad (Sosnovyi Bor) and Kola plants 
and the Swedish Forsmark plant. Severe accidents taking place in these plant locations 
may, depending on the weather conditions, also have radiation effects requiring extensive 
protective measures in Finland as well. 
Target of the threat
In a severe nuclear power plant accident in Finland or Finland’s neighbouring areas, large 
amounts of radioactive materials can be released to the environment. Managing the 
radiation hazard requires action at all administrative levels and sectors. The measures 
can be considerable, requiring extensive investment by the society in preventing and 
mitigating the harmful effects.
An emerging radiation hazards requires quickly protecting people and launching 
protective measures concerning food and other production. In addition, measures 
concerning agriculture and forestry, food industry an other industry, water supply, traffic 
(road, air, maritime and rail traffic), 
leisure activities, trade, transport, import and export, cleaning of buildings and the 
environment and waste treatment and disposal, may be required. Various measures may 
be necessary in distances of up to hundreds of kilometres from the accident site.
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Managing the situation can also take a very long time: cleaning the environment and 
restoring normal living conditions, ensuring the cleanliness of foodstuffs and water and 
management of waste containing radioactive materials can take years. Recovery from the 
situation can take decades.
Method of implementation (possible)
In case of technical fault, the reactor can be stopped with high reliability. After stopping, 
cooling of the reactor is required to remove post-shut-down heat. A severe nuclear 
power plant accident can occur if the cooling of the reactor is lost and the tightness of 
the pressure-resistant structures surrounding the reactor is lost. Nuclear power plants 
have multiple independent safety systems operating through different means to prevent 
accidents. 
However, the possibility of severe accidents cannot be fully excluded, as the mechanism of 
occurrence of an accident can be a combination of an initial event and consequences not 
identified before. 
Intentionally damaging a nuclear power plant by damaging the reactor or its cooling 
systems can lead to significant radioactive emissions. In this case, the systems of the 
nuclear power plant are made inoperable with an external attack and possibly an assistant 
with the required know-how. 
All nuclear power plants have effective security arrangements which have made such 
threats very improbable.
A plane colliding with a nuclear power plant is not likely to damage the actual nuclear 
reactor, but the fuel in a large passenger plane causes a fire that can lead to an accident 
in very unfavourable conditions. In addition, the spreading of the emission into the 
environment cannot be prevented in this case as the shielding building has been 
damaged.  
Serious natural accidents can also trigger a nuclear power plant accident under extreme 
conditions, such as in Fukushima in 2011. Analyses made in the EU countries following 
the Fukushima accident of the impacts of extreme natural phenomena on nucleal 
safety, among other thins, brought up improvement needs at various plants, including 
Finland’s own nuclear power plants. Each country have prepared its own national action 
programme covering the required measures.
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Concatenation and recurrence of faults and disruptions
A severe nuclear power plant accident can cause a significant long-term reduction in 
Finland’s power production, especially if the other plant units of the plant need to be 
shut down. In addition, the reassessment of the safety of nuclear energy can lead to a 
temporary shutdown of nuclear power plants. An accident would also give cause for 
assessing the justification or general approval of the use of nuclear energy and thereby 
influence Finland’s future energy policy.
The direct health impacts of a radiation hazard will probably remain low, if there is 
success in the protection measures. However, the hazard would have significant effects 
on people’s living conditions and environment, as well as significant psychological and 
social negative effects. After the Fukushima accident, changes have been observed in 
the evacuees’ health, such as increased diabetes and cardiac disease due to the changed 
habits.
The economic impacts are extensive with regard to after-care and recovery, particularly 
due to the long-term nature of the situation. The scenario will also have effects on all kinds 
of production, which will be suspended in the hazard area. The society’s support would be 
needed for restarting production once the area has been made safe again. 
Finnish exports would also suffer in case of a radiation hazard. Based on the experience 
gained from the Fukushima and Chernobyl nuclear power plant accidents, other countries 
would probably require cleanliness certificates or measurements of all goods exported 
from Finland.
Assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
• The trend of likelihood was estimated to increase
Threat scenario/disruption
Trend of  
likelihood
Impacts of the threat scenario/disruption on vital functions
    Leadership
International 
and EU  
activities
Defence  
capability
Internal  
security
Economy,  
infrastructure 
and security  
of supply
Functional  
capacity of the 
population 
and services
Psychological 
resilience
Severe nuclear  
power plant  
accident in Finland 
or Finland’s 
neighbouring areas
— ** * ** ** *** *** ***
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APPENDICES
Table 1. Summary table of the assessment of the trend of likelihood and impact
Threat scenario/disruption
Trend of  
likelihood
Impacts of the threat scenario/disruption on vital functions
    Leadership
International 
and EU  
activities
Defence  
capability
Internal  
security
Economy,  
infrastructure 
and security  
of supply
Functional  
capacity of the 
population 
and services
Psychological 
resilience
Information operations ** ** ** ** ** ** ***
Political, financial and 
military pressure *** ** ** ** *** ** ***
Use of military force — *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Large-scale immigration ** ** * *** * *** **
Terrorist act targeting the 
structures of the society or 
large crowds
— ** * ** *** * * ***
Violent, large-scale civil 
disturbances — ** * ** *** * ** ***
Disruption of the public 
economy — * ** ** ** ** ** ***
Disruption of the financial 
system — * ** ** ** *** ** ***
Major disruption in power 
supply — ** * * ** *** *** **
Disruption in the availability 
of fuels — * * ** ** *** ** **
Severe disruptions in  
communications networks 
and services  
** * ** *** *** *** **
Disruptions in logistics — * ** ** ** *** *** **
Antimicrobial drug  
resistance * * ** * * ** **
Pandemic influenza or  
similar widespread epidemic — * * ** ** ** ** **
Highly infectious severe 
animal disease * * * * ** * **
Plant hazards - plant disease 
epidemic * * * * ** * **
Water supply disruptions * * * * ** ** **
Disruptions in food supply * * * * ** ** **
Maritime multi-sector 
accident ** * * ** *** * **
Nuclear power plant 
accident in Finland or 
Finland’s neighbouring areas
— ** * ** ** *** *** ***
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